May 22, 2012
I really don’t understand what’s happening in the #Zizek tag right now.

I really don’t understand what’s happening in the #Zizek tag right now.

(Source: notsafeformork)

May 16, 2012
ghoulmann:

From Verso Spring 2012 Catalog

Okay, seriously, I’m pretty sure that’s a painted picture of Zizek riding a horse. Which makes this the best book jacket ever, I think.

ghoulmann:

From Verso Spring 2012 Catalog

Okay, seriously, I’m pretty sure that’s a painted picture of Zizek riding a horse. Which makes this the best book jacket ever, I think.

May 9, 2012
proofmathisbeautiful:

wolframalpha:

Cramming for finals? 
It would take 30 hours of silent reading to finish a 1,000 page text book. 

…and reading it doesn’t mean you’re actually going to remember it! And even more importantly…reading it does NOT guarantee you’re going to understand it!!! :O
There was a bunch of times when I would study for thermo that I would read a page or even just a paragraph and stop and wonder what the heck I just read. Sometimes I wasn’t even sure it was in English! :/
I do NOT miss finals!!

Holy fuck, this means that the new Zizek book is ~500,000 words.
~500,000 words ALL SINGING THE HIGH PRAISES OF HEGEL!

proofmathisbeautiful:

wolframalpha:

Cramming for finals? 

It would take 30 hours of silent reading to finish a 1,000 page text book. 

…and reading it doesn’t mean you’re actually going to remember it! And even more importantly…reading it does NOT guarantee you’re going to understand it!!! :O

There was a bunch of times when I would study for thermo that I would read a page or even just a paragraph and stop and wonder what the heck I just read. Sometimes I wasn’t even sure it was in English! :/

I do NOT miss finals!!

Holy fuck, this means that the new Zizek book is ~500,000 words.

~500,000 words ALL SINGING THE HIGH PRAISES OF HEGEL!

May 9, 2012
stickyembraces:

Different perceptions of Hegel

This is so beautiful. And the tags, oh goodness, the tags.

stickyembraces:

Different perceptions of Hegel

This is so beautiful. And the tags, oh goodness, the tags.

(via hookedonsemiotics)

May 8, 2012
Žižek the Authoritarian

sterwood:

adumbrations:

kohenari:

In a post last week, I quoted Johann Hari on the myriad problems with Slavoj Žižek. Not surprisingly, fans of Žižek were quick to write to me about why Hari is wrong. The blogger at Interruptions, in fact, pointed me to an interesting piece by Graham Harman that serves as a response to Hari on the seriousness or intellectual weight of Žižek. Harman writes:

I agree with virtually none of Žižek’s politics or ontology, but I don’t see how you can read his books and not find him to be an intensely serious, well-read, and highly cultured person of immense intellectual gifts, one we are lucky to have in our midst. Enjoy him while you have him. We’re not going to have a philosopher this provocatively entertaining for centuries to come. (Giordano Bruno, who was burned at the stake in 1600, was probably the last.)

But most of all, the gift that Žižek has given us is the sense that it’s time to take clear, blunt positions on issues, after a two-decade interlude in which prose was always supposed to meander and hedge its bets and regard puns as if they were philosophical arguments. That was the 1980′s and much of the 1990′s, and Žižek was one of those who dealt that style a death-blow.

Let’s begin with some throat-clearing: I’ve read Žižek; I’ve taught whole courses on Marxism in the past and these courses have included works by Lenin; I continue to teach Marx regularly in several courses; I even teach a bit of Lacan in a course. I don’t see anything wrong with exposing people to their ideas, some of which I think ought to be taken quite seriously.

But now let’s get to the heart of the matter, to my critique of Žižek.

The sum total of Harman’s defense of Žižek is that he is a serious thinker and an interesting one. I don’t entirely disagree, though I think he’s more interesting as a philosopher than he is serious. But I see nothing in Harman’s defense that blunts the central criticism of Hari’s piece, namely that the things about which Žižek is serious and interesting are abhorrent. Hari is mistaken in claiming that Žižek is an incoherent or ridiculous figure; he is not. This is what Harman reacts against in his rebuttal of Hari, but it isn’t the part of Hari’s piece that interested me; what interested me was the critique of Žižek’s embracing of neo-Leninism as a political philosophy, seemingly without making a serious effort to connect the dots between what he admires in Leninism and what everyone abhors in Stalinism. On this point, Žižek’s problematic political philosophy, Harman doesn’t defend Žižek; instead, he affirms Hari’s argument.

Read More

This is an amazing article on the implicit authoritarianism in Zizek’s work, I would urge everyone to take a look.

Reblogging for later reading.

Okay, I read it finally, and now for the response. This is cut because this is going to be long (I just want to give somewhat full treatment here - especially for adumbrations - in the ways this is so woefully wrong, I think).

Read More

April 16, 2012

jpegartifacts:

“Hegel was right to point out again and again that, when one talks, one always dwells in the universal - which means that, with its entry into language, the subject loses its roots in the concrete life world. To put it in more pathetic terms, the moment I start to talk, I am no longer the sensually concrete I, since I am caught up in an impersonal mechanism which always makes me say something different from what I wanted to say - as the early Lacan liked to say, I am not speaking, I am being spoken by language. This is one way to understand what Lacan called “symbolic castration”: the price the subject pays for its “transubstantiation” from being the agent of a direct animal vitality to being a speaking subject whose identity is kept apart from the direct vitality of passions.”

Slavoj Zizek via Less Than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism 197 (via lacanianmarxism)

[Bolded parts mine]

Two points:

1) This reminds me of how Bryant talks about communication being an autopoietic system that exists outside the human systems that nonetheless give rise to them (they’re still in the same ‘environment’ though). This is why we often do things like say things we didn’t mean to, or feel unable to express ourselves in speech, that’s why “I am not speaking, I am being spoken by language”.

And somewhat related: 2) why does our entrance into the ‘symbolic’ realm of language divorce us from the “concrete life world”? Seriously, I don’t get this. Is it because language never meets up one-to-one with what it’s referencing? I don’t get how that means that we’re ontologically divorced from this “life world”, how we lose the “sensually concrete I”. There seems to be some serious conflation between epistemological and ontological notions here. Language, at best, divorces me from knowing the objects of the concrete life world, but it doesn’t effect my being amongst these things, or my ontological status. I still am what I was before I was thrown into the symbolic realm, but my epistemological reach may - may! - have changed.  Besides, the notion that we were at one, in our being, with the in-itself before we were immersed into the symbolic is laughable. This is a part that’s really lacking in Zizek, and I feel he has far too much Hegelian baggage here.

(via thedismembermentflan)

March 31, 2012
"Žižek goes on to maintain an adherence to the concept of truth within a grand narrative which takes him clearly outside of the post modernist universe. And this is his most direct criticism of Meillassoux, that there is truth in addition to and outside of knowledge. In dismissing the Transcendental as a “deceptive lure”, Žižek maintains, Meillasoux reverts to a limited materialism which can carry no message of active transformation. Žižek here is asking us to consider whether Hegel’s idealistic dialectic, in which all knowledge can be derived from truth, cannot be given a materialist twist. Using quantum physics and the uncertainty principle, we arrive once again at the concept of retrospective teleology in which the stringing together of contingent events which have emerged out of quantum processes and fields of uncertainty can be traced back only from from their teleological endpoint and cannot be divined in advance. Matter comes first, of course, but that matter is also subject to subjectivity and subjective perceptions of the material world and also lead us to undertake things which change that material world. This understanding of dialectical materialism means that the transcendent within the real is the thing which enables us to reach the transcendent endpoint. This, then, is the real “Real”. It is an inaccessible “Real” because it does not yet exist, just as there might not yet be a God, but at some point there may well be. “All we can do is wait for a contingent scientific breakthrough—only then will it be possible to retroactively reconstruct the logic of the process.” (Žižek)"

(via: http://ernstbloch.wordpress.com/2012/03/19/the-ontology-of-quantum-physics-and-transcendental-materialism-chapter-14/)

Okay, totally into this. Just became re-interested/invested in Less Than Nothing.

March 31, 2012
Less Than Nothing Table of Contents

In conjunction with some discussions going on on my dash right now, I thought I’d share this. It’s the table of contents for Less Than Nothing. Even just from this, it seems like Zizek’s being a lot more systematic than usual (though I would hope so, considering this thing is 1200 pages).

After a cut, because, why not?:

Read More

March 30, 2012
"What about Zizek? Rather than removing the Real from the radar and thus constructing the social as ‘realtight’ (Copjec), Zizek conceptualises social reality as fissured and self-external, his wager being that reality itself is always-already based on some exclusion or inconsistency – reality, as we know it, is ‘not all’. And it is here, in these very gaps and interstices in the social edifice, that Zizek
believes critical thought has its proper place."

Zizek Beyond Foucault by Heiko Feldner and Fabio Vighi, p. 27.

It seems that the problems they’re saying Zizek addresses and Foucault glosses over are ontological problems. Foucault is able to point out the history of seeming ahistorical ideas (e.g. ‘Truth’), but isn’t able to account for the ontological problems that ground a lot of these Foucauldian genealogies. As they quote Zizek on the issue:

when a typical Cultural Studies theorist deals with a philosophical
or psychoanalytical edifice, the analysis focuses exclusively on
unearthing its hidden patriarchal, Eurocentric, identitarian, etc.,
‘bias’, without even asking the … question: OK, but what is the
structure of the universe? How does the human psyche “really”
work?

(p. 26). This inability to ask ontological questions closes us in a loop where all we can do is critique the ‘hidden dimensions’ of some cultural edifice, or some piece of media, without asking the ontological questions that allow us to escape that loop. We just endlessly critique media or ‘texts’ in the broadest sense as sexist, racist, homophobic, etc., without any clear way of correcting those things, because we have no means of actually knowing what those things are, or of knowing what we are so as to figure out properly how we fit into those relations beyond their purely historical/genealogical boundaries.

I don’t know if I agree with that claim (it seems weird that Foucault wouldn’t have any room for ontology, especially since be was good friends with Deleuze and all), but it does seem like an interesting place to try and place Zizek as somehow being ‘beyond’ Foucault.

March 6, 2012

interruptions:

bcleezy:

stfuconservatives:

somepolitics:

sinidentidades:

sinidentidades:

First as Tragedy, Then as Farce: Cultural Capitalism as presented by Slavoj Zizek [snipped]

This is…interesting. I can totally see his point and agree to an extent. But what exactly would the solution be? Stop having poverty? I don’t know how to make that happen.

I wonder if Mr. Zizek has any suggestions. It’s a shame he’s so laconic on the subject.

He’s not saying that charity is bad necessarily, just that it’s bad when we use it as an end goal. The problem is those ‘beautiful soul’ types that give money away to charities without both (1) realizing the larger social structures at work in creating poverty/sexism/homophobia, etc. and (2) realizing our own engagement in such instances of systemic violence.

It’s the same with his critique of tolerant reason. He’s not against the idea of tolerance, but he is against this idea of absolute tolerance in the face of some absolute other whose essence (or whatever) can never be known - this whole idea that the other is so ‘other’ that the only action we can take in relation to them is some watered-down, pseudo-progressive ‘tolerance’. When my state (Nevada) was having a lot of troubles with meeting education standards in our high schools a few years ago, instead of taking the critical stance and examining why such large scale failing might be happening, the school district just lowered the education standards so that more people would be able to pass: that’s the logic of tolerance that Zizek’s against.

Same goes for charity: instead of taking a step back and examining things with a critical eye - even in so-called ‘progressive’ groups - we tend to throw money at the problem and tell ourselves that we’ve at least done something to alleviate pain/oppression/starvation/whatever, so that we’re no longer implicated in the ongoing occurrence of such. If there’s anything Zizek hates, it’s people like this. That’s why he at least has some respect for conservatives - they’re like stupid puppies, but stupid puppies that at least say exactly what they mean (even if it is racist/sexist/homophobic/xenophobic/whatever), whereas liberals and progressives distance themselves continually from the effects of their (non)actions, and thus probably do worse damage than other political orientations.

So, those basically are his suggestions. He just uses a Lacanian eye to try and show us the dogmatic ideological assumptions that retroactively create the fantasy life of the subject (if it’s true what some say that we always intend upon an object within our perception, Zizek would go a step further and make the claim that those intentions have pre-conscious ideological biases that help structure our very view - our intending - of the object itself).

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