I'm a philosophy student that tends to post about really serious things unseriously and about really unserious things seriously.
I was once described as a "beautiful, intelligent iguana".
See on Scoop.it - Philosophy everywhere everywhenOne of the major innovations of Onto-Cartography is the introduction of incorporeal machines. While incorporeal machines were already implicit in my treatment of Luhmann in The Democracy of Object…
Under Deleuze and Guattari’s account, the plane of content is composed entirely of bodies– what I call corporeal machines –affecting and being affected by one another. The relationship of a smith to his hammer and anvil, for example, belong to the plane of content. The way in which the interaction of these three machines affect one another differs from the way in which signifiers affect bodies. The perpetual hammering on the metal of the anvil produces corporeal changes in the smith’s body. His muscle structure, bone structure, and way of holding himself change over time. This is not the result of expression or signs.
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What I don’t get is whether or not Bryant’s still operating under a ‘materialist’ framework. I know the big point of disagreement between Bryant and Harman is that the latter isn’t a materialist, and it seems that with the introduction of ‘Incorporeal Machines’ as a category within Bryant’s framework that he’s moving in this direction as well.
At this point, the major point of conflict between the two thinkers would have to center around the importance of causation, and the role of networks, in their ontologies. Still, this is an interesting development.
[Also, I’m glad to see Bryant featured on wildcat2030, which usually focuses a lot on thinkers more directly tied to thinking about the sciences (biology, mostly), and stuff having to do with cyborg studies. Although, I guess this does cross over pretty well with Bryant’s work].
[Also, also, I think it’s worth mentioning that Harman is who finally convinced me that materialism wasn’t a strong enough framework to build an ontology of non-presence around. Maybe Bryant’s undergoing a similar change?]