I was once described as a "beautiful, intelligent iguana".
Manuel Delanda performs an amazing trick in this video. Not only does he untangle the threads of Deleuze’s thinking and profoundly connects it to complexity science but also makes a profound case for the role of philosophy as a synthetic discipline that can overcome the disciplinary barriers within science. Highly recommended.
I have a soft spot for Manuel, especially now that I’ve heard he has an accent. Also for his snide polemical remarks like “I don’t care what people say, idealism is inherently conservative” (but his swipe at Derrida sounds super amateur). Also cuz he talks about cool science things like genetics, computer science, and cool art/architecture things, and other things I don’t understand but wanna.
I think DeLanda (and perhaps Catherine Malabou? But I haven’t really read her) is one of the best challenges to the divide between analytic and continental philosophy. The divide usually lies in that analytic philosophy is supposed to be more focused on the ‘sciences’, while continental is focused on the ‘arts’. But DeLanda, definitely coming from the continental camp, is far more focused on the sciences, and is doing it in a way that’s far better than the analytic camp.
The beginning of his Philosophy and Synthetic Reason taught me more about emergence than a whole semester on the topic - and this is because he’s more sensitive to the Evental character of science. Whereas most analytic authors saw developments in complexity and emergence and thought “awesome! how can we fit this in ready-made debates about consciousness?” DeLanda saw this stuff and went “how does this fundamentally change the way we think about the world (if it does)?” And the latter seems a lot more important to me.
See on Scoop.it - Philosophy everywhere everywhenOne of the major innovations of Onto-Cartography is the introduction of incorporeal machines. While incorporeal machines were already implicit in my treatment of Luhmann in The Democracy of Object…
Under Deleuze and Guattari’s account, the plane of content is composed entirely of bodies– what I call corporeal machines –affecting and being affected by one another. The relationship of a smith to his hammer and anvil, for example, belong to the plane of content. The way in which the interaction of these three machines affect one another differs from the way in which signifiers affect bodies. The perpetual hammering on the metal of the anvil produces corporeal changes in the smith’s body. His muscle structure, bone structure, and way of holding himself change over time. This is not the result of expression or signs.
See on larvalsubjects.wordpress.com
What I don’t get is whether or not Bryant’s still operating under a ‘materialist’ framework. I know the big point of disagreement between Bryant and Harman is that the latter isn’t a materialist, and it seems that with the introduction of ‘Incorporeal Machines’ as a category within Bryant’s framework that he’s moving in this direction as well.
At this point, the major point of conflict between the two thinkers would have to center around the importance of causation, and the role of networks, in their ontologies. Still, this is an interesting development.
[Also, I’m glad to see Bryant featured on wildcat2030, which usually focuses a lot on thinkers more directly tied to thinking about the sciences (biology, mostly), and stuff having to do with cyborg studies. Although, I guess this does cross over pretty well with Bryant’s work].
[Also, also, I think it’s worth mentioning that Harman is who finally convinced me that materialism wasn’t a strong enough framework to build an ontology of non-presence around. Maybe Bryant’s undergoing a similar change?]